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Any comprehensive normative theory must deal with the problem
of how to regard and deal with those who reject the theory itself.
Preference utilitarianism, for example, must consider whether to
count as part of the total utility to be maximized the disutility
caused those who reject utilitarianism and prefer public adoption of
nonutilitarian principles. Similarly, welfare egalitarians must con-
sider whether to count welfare losses due to frustration of prefer-
ences for racist and hence nonegalitarian policies. This theoretical
problem of how a theory should treat its own rejection, because it
involves self-reference, leads not unexpectedly to a mine field of po-
tential paradoxes.' The welfare egalitarian or utilitarian may only
succeed in producing the state of affairs demanded by the theory by
aiming at a state of affairs proscribed by the theory. Paralyzing
paradoxes are avoided only by separating the truth of the theories
from whether their direct implementation or even their acceptance
as true would be self-defeating.'
Liberalism as a normative theory is not exempt from the problem
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of "foreign policy," the problem of how to treat nonliberal views and
their proponents.3 Liberalism, however, tries to minimize the prob-
lem by purporting to limit its jurisdiction to the moral issues of phys-
ical and psychological harm and the just distribution of resources.
Religious concerns and other moral concerns - questions of "the
Good" - are beyond the scope of the theory.
This jurisdictional limitation holds, however, only if liberalism and
its treatment of matters within the realm of its concern are not just
one sectarian position vying with other versions of the Good. Accord-
ingly, liberalism purports to occupy a different theoretical level from
that occupied by comprehensive religious views and views of the
morally good life and morally virtuous person.
I want here to register my doubts about liberalism's attempt to
occupy the high ground above sectarian battles. I am surely not the
first to do so. However, many who join me in denying liberal neutral-
ity, and who, like me, are fundamentally committed to the charac-
teristic policies of liberalism - substantial freedom of speech and
religion, personal privacy, a relatively free market, democratic politi-
cal structures, and official endorsement of equality of moral worth -
seriously underestimate the theoretical implications of repudiating
liberalism's claims to neutrality and to occupying a plane above that
on which disputes over God and Good are fought. If I am correct in
my critique, then the liberalism I endorse is itself just a sectarian
view on the same level as the religious and other views that it pur-
ports to be neutral about and to tolerate.
In what follows, I shall focus on the relation between liberalism
and religion. My argument, however, extends beyond religion and
encompasses all views of the Good that have implications for public
policy.
I shall proceed by first showing in Part II that liberalism is incon-
sistent with - and thus a rejection of - all illiberal religious tenets.
This inconsistency seriously weakens liberalism's case for toleration
of illiberal religions. I shall then argue in Part III that liberalism
cannot make out its case for excluding religious arguments from
shaping public policy. Not only does "secular" reason un-
derdetermine specific public policy issues, such as abortion, animal
rights, etc., but unsupplemented by theories of the Good, it cannot
resolve such basic issues as the nature of what is to be distributed by
liberal justice (resources, objective welfare, subjective welfare, etc.).4
3. See Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, 19 PHIL.
& AFF. 5, 24-26 (1990).
4. On the relation between a theory of the Good and what is to be distributed by
liberal justice, see WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 36-40
(1989).
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More fundamentally, liberalism cannot claim as a ground for exclud-
ing religion from public policy questions a superior or even a differ-
ent epistemology from that of religion.5 In other words, the truth of
liberalism (and falsity of illiberal religions) cannot rest on an episte-
mology that is a different and, for public policy issues, better episte-
mology - because it is fairer, more reasonable, more respectful of
autonomy, more consistent with our being free and equal, etc. -
than the epistemology employed to support religious claims, includ-
ing the claims of illiberal religions. No point of view exists other
than religious skepticism from which basing public policy on reli-
gious views is unfairly nonimpartial. To the extent liberalism is de-
fined by or rests on the insulation of public policy from religious
views, liberalism is undermined by its failure to find convincing
grounds for that insulation. Religious arguments about public policy
must be rejected retail, not wholesale, as would the versions of liber-
alism at issue.
II. LIBERALISM AS THE REJECTION OF ILLIBERAL RELIGIONS
Religion and liberalism are both historically and conceptually re-
lated. Although both religion and liberalism are "essentially con-
tested concepts," one surely would not accept a normative theory as
"liberal" unless it prescribed at least a certain level of religious toler-
ance. Religious tolerance can range from the bedrock "no one shall
be punished merely for believing a certain religious tenet" to the
neutralist liberal positions of Ackerman7 and Nagel8 that ban reli-
gious-based arguments (other than the potentially null set of those
accepted by everyone) from influencing coercive public policy. Of
course, many interpretations of religious tolerance and religious free-
dom lie in between these polar positions. My modest, and I believe
uncontroversial, point is that a theory that does not endorse at least
5. Neal has an excellent discussion of how liberalism attempts, unsuccessfully, to
establish itself on a different epistemological level from theories of the Good. Patrick
Neal, A Liberal Theory of the Good?, 17 CAN. J. OF PHIL. 567, 577-79 (1987).
6. I am dealing primarily with liberal arguments rather than liberal constraints on
state action, though the former have strong implications for the latter. Those implications
result from the fact that the liberal theories of the state with which I am concerned
entail that certain state actions are neither inherently legitimate nor inherently illegiti-
mate, but derive their legitimacy from the legitimacy of the arguments that support
them.
7. Bruce Ackerman, Neutralities, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 29 (R. Bruce
Douglass et al. eds., 1990).
8. THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY (1991).
one of these religiously tolerant positions cannot claim to be a ver-
sion of "liberalism."
If liberalism is true as a normative theory, then it follows that any
religious views that deny liberalism's tenets are false.9 If religion X
teaches that government should punish those who refuse to accept
the truth of religion X, then, if liberalism is true, that tenet of reli-
gion X is false. If religion Y teaches that government should tax
citizens to support religion Y, then, if liberalism rejects governmen-
tal support of religion, and is correct in doing so, religion Y's teach-
ing is false.
Further, if liberalism is true, then, paradoxically, the liberal case
for tolerating illiberal religions weakens. No case is sufficient for tol-
erating coercive illiberal acts advocated by those religions. As for
their illiberal advocacy and beliefs, liberalism's case for toleration
cannot, without contradiction, rest upon the possibility that the advo-
cacy is justified and the beliefs true. Just as freedom of speech can-
not rely on the search for truth as its basis for tolerating advocacy of
the repeal of freedom of speech 0 - but must rely on a value that
outranks the search for truth - so too must the case for tolerating
illiberal religious advocacy and belief rest on some value that out-
ranks the search for truth." Liberalism can rest on agnosticism re-
9. On one liberal's (Rawls') attempt to escape this implication by denying that
liberalism is "true," see Raz, supra note 3, at 15-16, 21-22. Raz argues that Rawls'
argument fails. Rawls' argument is found in John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping
Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987), and John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:
Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 225 (1985). For another attempt to
deny this implication of liberalism, namely, that illiberal religions are false, an attempt
that looks very much like the attempt by Rawls that Raz attacks, see KENT R. GREENA-
WALT. RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 55-56 (1988); see also
MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER 16-22 (1991). The more common liberal attempt
to deny this implication is to argue that liberalism's "truth" is on a different epistemolog-
ical level from illiberal religions' "truth." See NAGEL, supra note 8, at 155-56.
Some "liberals" wish to deflect this claim by arguing that neither liberalism nor illib-
eral religions are "true." For example, Rorty repudiates all metaphysical claims that
might ground religious or other conceptions of the Good - or even ground liberalism
itself - but emphasizes with self-conscious "irony" the importance of protecting a pri-
vate sphere for individuals freely to seek the Good. See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY,
IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY xiv-xv, 84-85, 120, 198 (1989).
In support of this paragraph's claim, see Steven Macedo, The Politics of Justification,
18 POL. THEORY 280, 289 (1990).
10. See Carl A. Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Le-
gal-Political Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173 (1956).
11. On the paradox of liberalism's toleration of illiberal views, see ALLEN
BUCHANAN. SECESSION 34-35, 101-02 (1991); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, 'He Drew a Cir-
cle That Shut Me Out: Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal
Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 584 n.8 (1993). On the paradox of liberalism's not
tolerating such views, see Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 191-92 (1992); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious
Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 149, 149-52, 184-87 (1991).
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garding some truths, but not regarding its own truth.12 Toleration of
illiberal religions may rest on the value of autonomy (so long as
those religions do not threaten autonomy), 3 or toleration of illiberal
religions may rest on a prediction that intolerance would provoke a
backlash that would threaten liberalism to a greater extent than tol-
eration. The case for toleration of illiberal religions, however, cannot
rest upon their possible truth without self-contradiction. 4
III. LIBERALISM AND THE EXCLUSION OF RELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS
IN FORMULATING PUBLIC POLICY
As I said, the above argument should be uncontroversial. If liber-
alism or the set of propositions to which it can be reduced is true,
then religious tenets that conflict with the propositions of liberalism
are false. Liberalism is in this respect just one more sectarian posi-
tion, and those who deny the "religion" of secularism that they find
characteristic of modern liberal societies have surely affixed the cor-
rect label to their concern, even if what disturbs them is something
they should instead welcome. If, however, liberalism is a sectarian
position, then is it in fact better justified than its competitors?
The problem arises with respect to religious and other comprehen-
sive theories of the Good that are nonindividualistic or other-regard-
ing in nature.' 5 According to such theories, an individual's good is
12. On the dilemma of liberal toleration, and the self-undermining nature of argu-
ments from skepticism, see LOREN LOMASKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND THE MORAL COM-
MUNITY 251-53 (1987); Henry S. Richardson, THE PROBLEM OF LIBERALISM AND THE
GOOD, ill LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 4-6 (R. Bruce Douglass et al. eds., 1990). See also
John Kekes, The Incompatibility of Liberalism and Pluralism, 29 AM. PHIL. Q. 141
(1992).
13. On whether there is value in the exercise of autonomy resulting in choosing an
illiberal - and thus, from the liberal's viewpoint, false - religion, see the exchange
between Waldron and Raz. Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz's Mo-
rality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1097, 1127-52 (1989); Joseph Raz, Facing Up: A
Reply, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1227-35 (1989). See also David Hollenbach, Religion
and Political Life, 52 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 87, 90 (1991).
14. On Locke's arguments for toleration of false religions and the limits of those
arguments, see Jeremy Waldron, Locke: Toleration and the Rationality of Persecution,
in JUSTIFYING TOLERATION 61, 69-81 (Susan Mendus ed., 1988).
15. These theories of the Good are, at bottom, inconsistent with the high value
liberals place on autonomy with respect to religion, lifestyle, etc. For the liberal, autono-
mous choices must be respected so long as doing so does not conflict with granting a like
domain of autonomy to others. For those who believe in other-regarding theories of the
Good, choosing for oneself entails choosing for others, though choosing what others
would also choose were they fully enlightened and properly motivated. See MARTIN E.
MANTY & R. SCOTT APPLEBY, FUNDAMENTALISM & THE STATE 24-25, 28-29 (1993);
JEFFREY REIMAN, JUSTICE AND MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 207-08 (1990). Even theo-
ries of the Good that give pride of place to individual autonomy are inconsistent with
inextricably dependent upon the good of others, such as the salvation
of their souls or their adherence to norms regulating behavior not
directly harmful to others. Because an individual's good is dependent
on others in this way, the individual can be just as harmed by others'
failures to attend to their souls or their virtue as by direct physical
assaults, theft, deception, or sensory offense. And just as an individ-
ual may legitimately employ the coercive apparatus of the state to
protect against physical harm, theft, and offense, so too on these
views of the Good may the individual employ that coercive apparatus
to save souls, enforce virtue, and so forth.
The liberal tries to refute these views. The liberal, however, does
not face these views head on and show that the salvation of souls is
meaningless or incapable of being accomplished through force,"6 or
that no one is harmed in any way other than through physical as-
sault, theft, deception, or offense. Instead, the liberal argues that
even if these views are correct, enforcing them against those who
reject them is unfair or nonimpartial in some trumping sense. For
even those who hold such views can see that those views could be
reasonably rejected by others and, therefore, should not be
enforced.
17
To assess the justifiability of liberalism as it relates to religious
views, let me move from the abstract treatment of liberalism's logi-
cal implications and look at a concrete case. Ann has been brought
up in a religion within the Judeo-Christian family of religions. She
believes in the existence of a God, whom she pictures vaguely as a
person, and in the moral authority of the leaders of her church. She
perhaps also believes in the divinity of the biblical Christ. Although
Ann first came to these beliefs by accepting the teachings of her
parents, she now holds these beliefs based on what she views as inde-
pendent and superior reasons. For example, she believes most of the
accounts of God's and Christ's miraculous deeds in the Old and New
Testaments are credible. She holds these beliefs based on the num-
ber of witnesses,' their independently tested reliability, and the num-
ber of intelligent people who accept these accounts as true. The
miracles for her establish the authority of the moral teachings in the
some versions of liberalism, those that view autonomy as a constraint on public policy
rather than as a good to be fostered. See NAGEL, supra note 8, at 165; REIMAN, supra, at
207-08; Charles E. Larmore, Political Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 339, 346 (1990).
16. On salvation's being incapable of being accomplished by force, see Waldron,
supra note 14, at 68-81, esp. 79-81.
17. Liberalism does not argue, for example, that all religious views are incorrect,
or that correct religious views support liberalism. Liberalism, while inconsistent with il-
liberal religious views, attempts to avoid head-on refutation of them by purporting to
operate at a different epistemological level. This attempt is what I wish to repudiate. See
also Kai Nielsen, The Burden of Ideological Masks in Ideologiekritik: On Trying to
View Faith Scientifically, 23 METAPHIL. 251, 255-56 (1992).
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Bible, which are in turn independently verified by their consonance
with her own feelings about moral issues and with the teachings of
people she finds admirable. Moreover, these mutually reinforcing be-
liefs for Ann make sense of human existence in general and her own
life in particular.
The purpose of this portrait of Ann is to show how continuous
Ann's religious epistemology is with her epistemology in general, and
how all of her beliefs, criteria of evidence, and methods of reasoning
cohere. Ann's religious beliefs are supported in exactly the same way
as are her beliefs that Washington was the first president, that Kin-
shasha is the capital of Zaire, that Maris hit sixty-one home runs,
and that the speed of light is constant. She does not believe any of
these things based on first-hand observation, and the last item she
finds counter-intuitive and impossible to conceptualize, though she
believes it to be true, nonetheless.18
Further, no reason exists for not portraying Ann as a person who
entertains the possibility that many of her beliefs, including her reli-
gious beliefs, might be wrong (though, of course, she does not cur-
rently believe they are wrong, or else they would not be her beliefs).
Ann may worry about the veracity of biblical sources, or about the
coexistence of a benign, all-powerful God with evil. She may wonder
why the truth of Christianity was revealed at a particular time and
place in a manner that could not fail to make its acceptance local, or
whether, had she been reared in Tehran, she would believe in Islam
even if given all the evidence of Christianity's truth.
I have written thus far about Ann's beliefs and the reasons she has
for holding them. I have not mentioned faith, much less contrasted it
18. See generally John Hardwig, The Role of Trust in Knowledge, 88 J. PHIL. 693
(1991) (knowledge rests on trust).
Greenawalt, in defending a role for religious argument in a liberal democracy against
those whom I call "pure" liberals, points out how religious beliefs can rest on the same
kinds of evidence and reasoning as other beliefs. See Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 57-76,
esp. 71-75; Kent R. Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice: Some Fur-
ther Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1019, 1029-33, 1042 (1990). Greenawalt seems quite
ambivalent in these passages, on the one hand pointing out how similar religious beliefs
are to other beliefs, but on the other hand stating that religious beliefs are for the most
part interpersonally inaccessible. Greenawalt does not explain how religious beliefs are
inaccessible in a way different from observations of historical events or foundational ethi-
cal beliefs, both of which secular liberalism deems admissible. See C.A.J. Coady, TESTI-
MONY 6-9, 12-13, 16-17 (1992). For further discussion of the inaccessibility of religious
and other beliefs, see infra text accompanying notes 40-42.
with reason. For one thing, I am not sure how to make an epistemo-
logical distinction between faith and reason. 19 Ann has "faith" in
modern physics, in her personal physician, and in her husband's fi-
delity. Of course, her faith in these is grounded in reasons she has.
Likewise, Ann's religious faith is not just a faith in anything. She
does not believe she could have faith in whatever she wants to be-
lieve, religiously or otherwise. Her "faith" is, for her, a product of
reason.
2 0
Ann holds various views on public policy that rest in part on her
religious beliefs. She believes that fetuses are morally protectable
and have a right to life that trumps women's rights regarding repro-
duction. She believes that animal life is worthy of protection, and
that meat-eating and vivisection should be illegal. She believes that
pornography is blasphemous because it degrades sexuality that God
intends be ennobled; she, therefore, wants pornography legally
banned. She believes that public money should be used to support
the private schools that teach her religious beliefs.
As I have said, there are various versions of liberalism, and not all
of them would find all of Ann's public policy recommendations il-
licit. Versions that I shall label "purist" - the versions endorsed by
Ackerman, Dworkin, Larmore, Nagel, and Rawls 2' - would reject
all four of Ann's policy recommendations if they can be "justified"
only by Ann's religious beliefs. "Impure" liberalisms, such as Green-
awalt's,22 would reject only the latter two, because "secular" reason-
ing can reach no conclusions regarding issues like abortion and
animal rights. Both pure and impure versions of liberalism are sub-
ject to my critique.
19. For discussions of the distinction or lack of distinction between faith and rea-
son, see FAITH, REASON, AND SKEPTICISM: ESSAYS BY WILLIAM P. ALSTON (Marcus Hes-
ter ed., 1992).
20. Some of religion's strongest supporters load the dice against religion by deem-
ing it the realm of "faith" as opposed to "reason." See Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism,
Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE LJ. 977, 987-94; Stephen
L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932, 938-42 (1989).
This is a move much more typical of those who wish to exclude religion from the public
square. See, e.g., Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the Constitutional Definition of Reli-
gion, 44 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 39 (1991); Allan Ides, Bowers v. Hardwick: The Enigmatic
Fifth Vote and The Reasonableness of Moral Certitude, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 93,
105-06 (1992).
21. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); Ron-
ald M. Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113-43 (Stuart Hamp-
shire ed., 1978); CHARLES LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987); NAcEL,
supra note 8; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). See also Charles E. Larmore,
The Limits of Aristotelian Ethics, in VIRTUE 185, 191-95 (John W. Chapman & Wil-
liam Galston eds., 1992).
22. See GREENAWALT, supra note 9.
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A. Impure Liberalism
The impure liberal would allow religious arguments to shape pub-
lic policy whenever secular arguments cannot resolve the issues at
stake. Greenawalt argues that two of Ann's concerns, abortion and
animal rights, raise issues that secular reasoning cannot resolve.
Thus, liberalism must permit religious views to shape the resolution
of these issues.23
Impure liberals like Greenawalt seriously underestimate the de-
gree to which religion's nose is inside the liberals' tent on their ac-
count of impure liberalism. 24 Greenawalt at times appears to believe
that only a modest number of issues lying at the periphery of liber-
alism's agenda will be incapable of secular resolution, and that,
therefore, religion's influence on public policy will be, in principle at
least, limited and well-defined. 25 Greenawalt, though, does recognize
that core issues, such as the just distribution of wealth, seem to in-
volve not only "secular" reasons that are "neutral" regarding theo-
ries of the Good, but also reasons that are partisan regarding the
Good. "Neutral" reasons are incapable of adjudicating whether re-
sources, objective welfare, subjective welfare, or something else is
the object of liberal distributive policies.2 6 Moreover, among partisan
23. See Greenawalt, Religious Convictions, supra note 18, at 1022, 1041, 1043.
For accounts of Greenawalt's position see Austin, supra note 20, at 36-37, 41; Perry,
supra note 9, at 16-17; Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083,
1100 (1990); Kenneth I. Winston, Critical Notice, 3 CAN. J. OF L. AND JURISPRUDENCE
129, 136-37 (1990).
24. See PERRY, supra note 9, at 19-20. Perry notes that the line between secular
and religious will be a hard one for Greenawalt to draw. Id. at 19. If religious and
secular epsitemologies are but a single epistemology, then it follows that the line between
"secular" and "religious" will be arbitrary and at best a matter of convention.
25. Thus, to illustrate his thesis that religious arguments may sometimes be re-
sorted to in a liberal democracy to determine public policy, Greenawalt points to issues
of moral status that he labels as "borderline" issues - for example, the issues of abor-
tion and animal rights. See GREENAWALT, supra note 9, chs. 6, 7.
26. Id. at 173-87.
On neutrality and the issue of what should be the liberal's distribuendum, see Donald
H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL.
L. REV. 995, 1042-43 (1989). Regan points out that what people want is not satisfaction
of their desires, or even their own well-being as such, but the success of projects that are
in fact valuable. See also WILL KYMLICKA. CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
203, 208-10 (1990). People do not want neutrality regarding the Good, but fulfillment of
what is truly Good. For Regan, this implies that government should aim not at neutral
fulfillment of well-being, but at accomplishing the truly Good. Of course, government
may be less competent at answering some moral questions than others, and religious
questions may be among them. Only a thoroughgoing religious skeptic or an adherent of
a liberal religion, though, could argue as a matter of principle to exclude religious argu-
ments from the realm of public policy.
reasons, Greenawalt does not distinguish between the secular and the
religious, much less favor the former over the latter.
Regan's point about the Good can be put as follows: autonomy cannot be the only
value, because without values (the Good) for autonomy to aim at, autonomy is worthless.
On the other hand, if an objective Good exists, it and autonomy will be in tension with
each other, especially if autonomy is regarded by the liberal as a side-constraint rather
than as one value among others to be furthered. See also WILLIAM GALSTON, LIBERAL
PURPOSES 86-89 (1991).
For a view of autonomy opposed to Regan's, see John Christman, The Humanist Basis
of Egalitarianism 21, 28 (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Christman does not deny other objective values, but he views autonomy and equality as
trumping values for public policy, even if no one aims at autonomy as an end in itself.
The discussion in this footnote is meant to illustrate how religious and other views of
the Good permeate those issues of just treatment that liberals might wish could be insu-
lated from such sectarian claims. While I tend to side with Regan in doubting whether
respect for autonomy is sufficient for grounding distributive justice - see Larry Alexan-
der & Maimon Schwarzschild, Liberalism, Neutrality, and Equality of Welfare vs.
Equality of Resources, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 85 (1987) - Christman's opposing view
has powerful allies. See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights Whether and
How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 381, 414 (1992). The important
point, however, is that even if Christman and Dworkin are correct that equality of re-
spect for autonomy suffices as a basis for distributive justice, that value is no less "meta-
physical" or "religious" than the more particular values that Regan and I think are
necessary. It is not neutral among theories of the Good; it is a theory of the Good, or at
least on the same epistemological level as such theories.
27. See GREENAWALT, supra note 9, at 191-92. For an attack on Greenawalt's
impure liberalism from a more purist direction, one arguing that "secular" beliefs are
capable of resolving all of Greenawalt's hard issues, see PETER S. WENZ, ABORTION
RIGHTS AS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 112-13, 119-31, 135-39 (1991). Wenz distinguishes sec-
ular from religious beliefs as follows:
Religious beliefs are those that cannot be established by appeal merely to secu-
lar premises and methodologies. Secular premises and methodologies include
what passes for common-sense knowledge in our society (e.g., fire burns people,
punishment deters crime), the scientific beliefs that underlie our technology
(e.g., electrons and bacteria exist), the methodology accepted in our society for
the generation of scientific and technological knowledge (e.g., observation, mi-
croscopes, carbon dating, and mathematical calculations can be useful), and
the values considered essential to society (e.g., peaceful coexistence among its
members, limits on assault and murder) or essential to our type of society (e.g.,
individual liberty, private property, pluralism, and hard work). More generally,
secular premises are drawn from secular beliefs. I term "secular beliefs" all
those agreements of belief, thought, and practice that are the basis of the coop-
eration and mutual understanding needed among people to maintain and per-
petuate our society.
Religious beliefs are those that cannot be supported cogently with arguments
or demonstrations whose premises include only secular beliefs. What is more,
for First Amendment purposes, all religious matters are religious because of
their relationship to religious beliefs. For example, "creation science" is reli-
gious because it results from an interpretation of the Bible. The Bible is a
religious text because of its relationship to belief in the existence of God, whose
actions in history it is supposed to record. Belief in the existence of God cannot
be supported cogently by the use of common sense, science, technology, or ac-
cepted scientific methodologies, so it is a religious belief.
I call this the epistemological definition of religion because religion is de-
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Indeed, the impure liberal's notion of what issues are un-
derdetermined by "secular" arguments, and thus the legitimate sub-
jects of religious ones, threatens to bring the entire liberal tent
crashing down. The impure liberal seems to take controversy among
self-proclaimed liberals as a sign that secular reasoning has gone as
far as it can go and must be supplemented by alternative brands of
reasoning, such as religious reasoning. 8 Abortion, animal rights, and
what is to be distributed are highly controversial among liberals,
none of whom has committed an error of syllogistic inference or has
relied on incorrect accounts of empirical facts. Therefore, according
to the impure liberal, these are issues that can only be resolved by
recourse to sectarian views. If, however, the impure liberal is correct
about this, then the dam of principle holding back thoroughgoing
religious influence on policy making is completely breached. For on
almost every policy issue - the meaning and scope of freedom of
speech, economic freedom, privacy, free exercise of religion, equal
treatment, community self-determination, the justification of punish-
ment, procedural rights, and so on - self-proclaimed liberals are
deeply divided. Although one cannot be a "liberal" if one rejects all
conceptions of free speech, privacy, etc., no liberal party line exists
on any aspect of liberalism. Impure liberalism as a theory is too
skeptical about the power of secular reasoning to resolve issues that
are controverted among liberals to provide a convincing argument
against wholesale admission of religious arguments in policy
making.29
Wenz's distinction between "secular" and "religious" is unconvincing, both as to mat-
ters of material fact and as to matters of value. Both common-sense and scientific factual
knowledge, as well as common moral beliefs, rest ultimately on undemonstrable meta-
physical views. As Ronald Dworkin puts it, "[Wenz's] test is not acceptable, because
government must make and impose decisions on a wide variety of moral issues about
which people disagree profoundly, and which cannot be decided on empirical grounds or
by appeal to any convictions shared by everyone or by methods that are in any other way
'integral' to any collective way of life." Dworkin, supra note 26, at 421-22 n.60. For a
position that supports Wenz's distinction between religious and secular arguments,
though not Wenz's conclusion regarding the primacy of the latter, see Carter, The Relig-
iously Devout Judge, supra note 20, at 938-39.
Moreover, Wenz is forced by his own argument to declare all religious beliefs unwar-
ranted because they make claims to truth regarding the same matters that "secular"
beliefs concern. But then freedom of religion, which claims to be truth-seeking, does not
merit the liberal's concern beyond the psychological effects on religion's adherents.
28. See Raz, supra note 3, at 42.
29. See generally, id. at 23, 42-43; Winston, supra note 23, at 137-41. See also
THOMAS SPRAGENS, JR., THE IRONY OF LIBERAL REASON (1981). Spragens argues that
liberalism has been undermined by its celebration of technological conceptions of reason
and its value noncognitivism. Enlightenment-based animus to religious authority may
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the impure liberal's breach
of the dam barring religious arguments fails to take into account the
interconnectedness of beliefs. For if religion can "get it right" about,
say, abortion, why can it not "get it right" about such things as, say,
sin, or other matters that the impure liberal would make the exclu-
sive province of the secular? The grounds that support accepting a
religion's view on one issue are quite likely to support accepting its
views on other issues. Put differently, one cannot buy religious views
at retail, specific issue by specific issue; they are available only at
wholesale.
B. Pure Liberalism
The pure liberals - Ackerman, Dworkin, Larmore, Nagel, and
Rawls30 - believe that secular reasons should resolve all issues in
the public sphere, including how the line defining that sphere is to be
drawn. The issues of abortion and animal rights can and must be
resolved without recourse to religious views, just as the impure lib-
eral, Greenawalt, would resolve issues of, say, the criminalization of
self-regarding vices. The pure liberal would find all of Ann's policy
recommendations unjustifiable to the extent that they are based on
the arguments Ann provides for them.
What grounds does the liberal have for finding Ann's policy rec-
ommendations unjustifiable except for competing religious beliefs or
beliefs that all religious beliefs are untrue, or at least unjustifiable?
The liberal's rejection of religious-based policies suggests some sort
of epistemological divide or discontinuity between what we can claim
justifiably to know secularly, so to speak, and what we can claim
justifiably to know religiously, the latter being an inferior form of
knowledge for purposes of public policy, though perhaps not for
other purposes. No such epistemological divide exists, however, that
will give liberalism its justification for rejecting the legitimacy of
Ann's proposals.
It is easy to dispose of one possible basis for rejecting Ann's poli-
cies, namely, that the religious beliefs she relies on are not empirical.
Without entering the epistemological thicket surrounding the status
of empirical knowledge and its connection to theories that ultimately
rest, in part, on nonempirical norms,31 it is obvious that liberalism
cannot avail itself of any empirical/nonempirical divide. For the pro-
positions of liberalism are not empirical, but metaphysical and
have resulted in placing technocratic "reason" in an exalted status; "reason's" failure to
resolve value disputes may have left liberalism vulnerable to attack.
30. See supra note 21.
31. See Frederik M. Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L.
Ra\'. 671, 684-86 (1992).
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normative. 2
More likely the liberal will want to argue that religious beliefs are
less subject to reasoned assessment than moral beliefs, such as those
of liberalism. If this argument is not just another way of rejecting
the justifiability of religious beliefs altogether, which itself would re-
quire that other religious beliefs - skeptical ones such as agnosti-
cism or atheism - are justifiable, then the argument is implausible.
Moral reasoning rests either on nonempirical premises or on infer-
ences that are not matters of logical entailment. This is surely the
case with liberalism. Reason in the narrow sense that might be em-
ployed to discredit religious arguments equally discredits normative
arguments." And reason in the broader, reflective equilibrium sense,
that might make one moral view more reasonable than another,
seems just as applicable to religious views. 4
Liberals attempt to disenfranchise religious arguments on other
grounds. Some, like Ackerman and Nagel, believe that reliance on
religious arguments, like Ann's, to establish public policy is inappro-
priately nonneutral or nonimpartial, i.e., "unfair" to those who do
not share Ann's religious views.35 This tack is question-begging at
two levels. First, to repeat an earlier point, the demonstration that
the Ackerman/Nagel conception of fairness trumps religious
grounds would require arguments for that conception and against the
competing religious grounds that liberals such as Ackerman and
Nagel fail to make. How could they make them, though, without
doing theology as well as moral philosophy?35
Second, Ann would dispute the claim that acting on her religious
views in effecting public policy is in any way unfair to those who
reject her religious views. Fairness, neutrality and impartiality are
32. See, Austin, supra note 20, at 36-37.
33. See GALSTON, supra note 26, at 111-12; PERRY, supra note 9, at 19, 120-21;
Michael J. Perry, Toward an Ecumenical Politics, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 1, 30 (1991).
Both Greenawalt and Wenz fail to appreciate that the reasons for holding religious be-
liefs are no more inaccessible to others than are the reasons for holding those secular
moral and factual beliefs that they would deem admissible on public policy matters. See
Greenawalt, Religious Convictions, supra note 18, at 1032-33, 1041; WENZ, supra note
27, at 119-31.
34. See Gedicks, supra note 31, at 693-94. Cf. Winston, supra note 23, at 132,
136-37 (arguing for ability of "secular" moral reasoning to go further than Greenawalt
thinks it can, but not distinguishing religious reasoning in this respect).
35. See ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 44, 110-11; NAGEL, supra note 8, at Ch. 14;
Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF 215, 218
(1987).
36. See Robert P. George, Moralistic Liberalism and Legal Moralism, 88 MICH.
L. REV. 1415, 1423 (1990).
concepts, like equality, that are empty vessels for substantive norms.
If abortion is the killing of a being that should be legally protected,
then in what sense is it unfair to those who reject this truth to out-
law abortion? If fairness requires placing legal duties on persons
only if those duties are truly morally required, then from Ann's per-
spective, passing laws against abortion is not unfair.37 Of course,
from the perspective of those who disagree with Ann, such a law is
unfair, but its unfairness lies in its error and not its source. This
conflict of views about fairness is, therefore, inevitable. Unless Ack-
erman/Nagel liberals advocate, in the name of fairness, a unanimity
requirement for public policy - and why is that "fair" (and what
public policies are the default policies in case no unanimity exists,
anyway?) - then public policies are fair if they are morally correct.
Moral correctness may truly be the function of some forms of equal
treatment or equal regard, but if Ann's views are correct, then it
follows from their correctness that they already incorporate the cor-
rect conception of equal regard.3"
The Ackerman/Nagel liberal is arguing that Ann's views are in-
correct, at least the component of them that dictates that they be
coercively imposed. The liberal is using the unfairness of the coercive
imposition as grounds for claiming Ann's views are incorrect. I have
shown that some senses of unfairness fail to support the liberal's
argument.
Nagel, for example, argues that coercive imposition of norms is
unfair (in a morally overriding sense) if such norms are reasonably
rejectable. Norms are reasonably rejectable in this disqualifying
sense if they rest on grounds that are not publicly accessible. Reli-
gious grounds are not publicly accessible to those who are outside
the religion. Therefore, it is morally true - contrary to the teach-
ings of Ann's religion - that it is morally wrong for Ann to seek to
impose coercively her views on abortion, support of religious schools,
etc. 9
37. See Greenawalt, Religious Convictions, supra note 18, at 1037.
38. See Galston, supra note 26, 108-09. See also GREENAWALT, supra note 9, at
55; Winston, supra note 23, at 136.
39. Nagel's position was first put forward in Nagel, supra note 35. He revised that
position slightly in NAGEL, supra note 8:
[Religious values].., are not just values on which persons who are not grossly
unreasonable or irrational may disagree, but values of such a type that a per-
son cannot reasonably be expected to agree to a system which authorizes the
use of political power to enforce or promote values opposed to his own, just
because the majority accepts them.
This depends on the assumption that one may be justified in holding a belief
about something of fundamental importance without having to conclude that
those who do not share it are irrational or unreasonable, even though they have
been presented with the same reasons or evidence that one has found compel-
ling. It is not easy to say what distinguishes cases like this from others in which
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Let me skip the question of whether Nagel's reasonable rejection
conception of fairness fails its own test, i.e., whether someone like
the recalcitrance of those who are not convinced can be dismissed as unreason-
able. It seems to me clear that as things now are, those who do not accept the
truth of a particular religion (or of atheism) ought not to be judged unreasona-
ble by those who do, and that anyone who today is unconvinced by the germ
theory of disease must be judged irrational. This is to reject the position that it
is reasonable to believe something only on grounds which make it unreasonable
or irrational not to believe it. That would make any reasonable belief an ade-
quate ground for coercion, because those who did not accept it after being
given those grounds could be coerced on grounds that it was unreasonable for
them to reject. Likewise it would be unreasonable to hold any belief that others
could reasonably reject and that was therefore not a possible basis for coercion.
I just don't think belief is like that: There is a substantial middle ground
between what it is unreasonable to believe and what it is unreasonable not to
believe (where belief and non-belief are taken as exhaustive - so non-belief is
not belief). Belief is reasonable when grounded on inconclusive evidence plus
judgment. In such a case one usually acknowledges the possibility of some fur-
ther standard to which impersonal appeal can be made, even though it cannot
settle existing disagreements at the moment. But even without such a standard,
belief may not be unreasonable. In any case, it would be absurd to claim that
individuals should decide what to do in their own lives only on grounds which
they believe it would- be unreasonable for anyone else to reject, including
grounds having to do with fundamental values they believe to be objectively
correct.
But in the political realm we have to find a more objective form of justifica-
tion. If those whom we propose to subject to political coercion cannot be ex-
pected to accept the values we wish to further by it, we will be justified only if
there is another description of the grounds of coercion that they can be re-
quired to accept. Sometimes, "You lost the election" will serve that purpose,
but not always. It depends on whether the issue is one which it is reasonable to
require everyone to put to decision by vote.
This is really a problem of how to interpret the familiar role-reversal argu-
ment in ethics: "How would you like it if someone did that to you?" That
argument invites the further question, "How would I like it if someone did
what to me?" Since there is more than one true description of every action, the
selection of the morally operative one is crucial. If someone believes that by
restricting freedom of worship he is saving innocent people from the risks of
eternal damnation to which they are exposed by deviation from the true faith,
then under that description he presumably would want others to do the same
for him, if he were in spiritual danger. But under the description "restricting
freedom to worship," he wouldn't want others to do it to him, since in light of
the fact that his is the true faith, this would be to hinder his path to salvation.
For purposes of political argument we have to exclude the description of
what is done in the contested terms of a particular faith, and find instead a way
of applying the role-reversal argument in terms of descriptions and values that
must be accepted by all reasonable parties, as a basis for regulating or han-
dling those disagreements that reason cannot eliminate.
Legitimate government would be impossible if it were never legitimate to
impose a policy on those who reasonably rejected the values on which it was
based. It is not in general a valid role-reversal argument to ask, "How would
you like it if someone did something to you' that you reasonably didn't want
him to do?" The reply is that you might not like it, but might nevertheless be
prepared to accept it, depending on the nature of their reasons and the institu-
tions or procedures under which they were empowered to act on them in oppo-
sition to your preferences. The legitimacy of democratic government depends
on its ensuring that we can all countenance, even if we don't like, what it may
impose on us against our wills. But this means that it is legitimate only if those
impositions that we should not be asked to countenance are kept beyond its
power.
Why should I not accept the efforts of others, if they can muster the neces-
sary political strength, to ensure my eternal salvation as they understand it by
preventing the spread of heresy and atheism? Why is this so different from
accepting what I may believe to be deeply misguided policies on public health,
national defense, or education, if they are democratically adopted?
The answer here cannot be just in terms of the priority of my interest in
basic personal autonomy over other people's interest in promoting what they
regard as a desirable moral environment, since we are dealing here not with a
conflict of interests but with a conflict over what my most fundamental inter-
ests are. Those who wish to limit my religious freedom are doing so, in the case
under consideration, with my own best interests in mind. They believe that
eternal salvation has priority in any person's good even over basic personal au-
tonomy, and if I shared their views I would have to agree with them. The
question is why my conception of my good should block the use of their con-
flicting conception in the justification of political control over me in this case,
but not in theirs.
I think the problem is that there is no higher-order value of democratic con-
trol or pursuit of the good abstractly conceived which is capable of command-
ing the acceptance by reasonable persons of constraints on the pursuit of their
most central aims of self-realization - except for the need to respect this same
limit in others. Ethics does not license an unmediated universal altruism, pre-
cisely because that leads in ordinary circumstances of disagreement over the
nature of the good to inevitable conflict rather than possible unanimity.
Id., at 161-64 (footnotes omitted).
Nagel's position is based upon his conception of Kantian respect, which he regards as
correct, and which is inconsistent with many conceptions of the Good, conceptions which
Nagel must regard as incorrect. See id., at 168 (expressing the hope that conceptions of
the Good that reject Nagel's conception of Kantian respect - "fanaticism" - will even-
tually die out).
William Galston indicates how Rawls has moved from viewing liberalism's neutrality
as based on a conception of justice that transcends and is normatively prior to all theories
of the Good to viewing it as a product of the overlap among particular theories of the
Good and thus incapable of providing reasons for acting to adherents of illiberal theories.
See GALSTON, supra note 26, at 143-49. (For a good discussion of the difficulties of
Rawls' current position, see id.; Raz, supra note 3, at 4-31.)
For a good description of the puzzlement someone like Ann must feel at being told by
liberals such as Nagel that her views may well be true but cannot be acted upon, see
Wieseltier, Two Concepts of Secularism, in ISAIAH BERLIN: A CELEBRATION 80-99
(Edna Margalit & Avishai eds., 1991):
The believer is less puzzled to be told that his belief is false than he is to be
told that his belief is beside the point. Hard secularism met the believer on his
own ground; it shared, even in its opposition to metaphysics, a metaphysical
urgency; and it agreed that the relationship of faith to power should be decided
by a consideration of its truth. In the hard secularist world, the believer who
lost the struggle for the identity of the society could feel martyred, physically
or symbolically, and await the day when his account of the world is finally
accepted. In the soft secularist world, by contrast, in a world of perfect toler-
ance, the urgency of ultimate issues has vanished from the public sphere of life,
and the discussion has been curiously relaxed. There is no martyrdom, there is
only marginality. Religious arguments about the public sphere of life will be
neither accepted nor rejected, since all the arguments of all the religions about
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Ann could reasonably reject it, or find the arguments for it inaccessi-
ble given her religious beliefs.40 Assume Nagel's test is not self-un-
dermining in this way. Does it render illegitimate Ann's policy
the public sphere of life have lost interest, have been discarded as an indifferent
subject for political conversation. Absolutes are not destroyed by democracy.
They are disarmed by it. They may swell within the souls of individuals, and
within the fellowship of individuals, who prefer not to live thoughtlessly, who
have given over to the protections of secularism their public lives, not their
private lives; but beyond a particular point the storm must subside, the agita-
tion must abate.
... The religious citizens of an open society may vigorously propound their
views on the questions of the day, but they must understand that in this sphere
some of their reasons will fail to persuade - that their most compelling reason
for their views, God's will, will not commonly compel. They will have to argue
for their views on other grounds. That is, they will have the exasperating expe-
rience of having others treat as opinion what they treat as truth.
Id., at 97-98.
See also GALSTON, supra note 26, at 117; Margaret Moore, Book Review, 26 Nous 548,
549-50 (1992).
40. Nagel is aware that one might argue that rejection of the reasonable rejection
test itself is, in fact, reasonable.
To restate the apparent paradox: Liberalism asks that citizens accept a certain
restraint in calling on the power of the state to enforce some of their most
deeply held convictions against others who do not accept them, and holds that
the legitimate exercise of political power must be justified on more restricted
grounds - grounds which belong in some sense to a common or public domain.
But it is not clear why this restricted form of justification should be the
standard of political legitimacy at all. To put the argument against: Why
should I care what others with whom I disagree think about the grounds on
which state power is exercised? Why shouldn't I discount their rejection if it is
based on religious or moral or cultural values that I believe to be misfaken?
Isn't that being too impartial, giving too much authority to those whose values
conflict with mine - betraying my own values, in fact? If I believe something,
I believe it to be true, yet here I am asked to refrain from acting on that belief
in deference to beliefs I think are false. It is unclear what possible moral moti-
vation I could have for doing that. Impartiality among persons is one thing, but
impartiality among conceptions of the good is quite another. True justice ought
to consist of giving everyone the best possible chance of salvation, for example,
or of a good life. In other words, we have to start from the values that we
ourselves accept in deciding how state power may legitimately be used.
And it might be added, aren't we doing that anyway, if we adopt the liberal
standard of impartiality? Not everyone believes that political legitimacy de-
pends on this condition, and if we impose political institutions on others in our
society because they do meet it (and block the imposition of institutions that do
not), why aren't we being just as partial to our own values as someone who
imposes a state religion? It has to be explained why this is a form of impartial-
ity at all. NAGEL, supra note 8, at 158-59.
See also RICHARD W. MILLER, MORAL DIFFERENCES 287-88 n.2 (1992); Carter, Evolu-
tionism, supra note 20, at 987 (is neutrality "neutral"?); Fred D'Agostino, The Idea and
the Ideal of Public Justification, 18 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 143, 158 (1992) (public
justification is recursive in nature). One upshot of my argument against Nagel is that
Ann can reasonably reject Nagel's reasonable rejection test because no conception of it
provides Ann with reasons to do what Nagel claims the test requires her to do (withdraw
recommendations if we assume the absence of unanimity, and if we
prescind the question whether, as matters of substantive morality
and religious truth, abortion, pornography, etc. should be
condemned?
Two senses in which grounds and arguments might be reasonably
rejectable or publicly inaccessible exist. One sense is too strong to
help Nagel, the other too weak. In the strong sense, Ann's beliefs are
reasonably rejectable and publicly inaccessible if we can understand
why others do not share those beliefs. Ann has had a unique life,
with unique experiences. She, but not others, witnessed certain
events from a certain point of view. She, but not others, was taught
certain things by particular people. Her particular beliefs - on all
sorts of matters - are as reasonably rejectable by and inaccessible
to others as, say, our beliefs about air travel, television, and the his-
torical Christ are reasonably rejectable by and inaccessible to Stone
Age tribes in Borneo who have never seen an airplane, a television
show, or a Christian.
This sense of reasonable rejectability/public inaccessibility is obvi-
ously too strong to serve Nagel's purpose, for it rules out imposition
of any norms whose rejection is understandable in this way. We can
surely understand how a "reasonable" slave owner in the Antebel-
lum South could reject imposition of a norm of racial equality. From
his perspective - given the web of his other beliefs - blacks were
inferior human beings. Nonetheless, Nagel would surely not think it
illegitimate to eradicate slavery coercively in the face of opposition
by such "reasonable" slave owners.4'
The other sense of reasonable rejectability/public inaccessibility is
too weak to serve Nagel's purpose. That sense would exclude the
imposition of only those norms that can be reasonably rejected by
someone after being privy to all the experiences, etc., of those who
accept the norms. Clearly, Ann will not accept rejection of her
norms as reasonable in this sense; her acceptance means that she
thinks acceptance is reasonable and rejection unreasonable. From
the point of view of the one whose norms they are, no accepted
norms can be reasonably rejected.42
her policy recommendations). See also GALSTON, supra note 26, at 146-49.
41. See GALSTON, supra note 26, at 113-17, 152; Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the
Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals After All, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1350, 1357,
1364-69 (1991); Raz, supra note 3, at 42-43, 45-46. See also Greenawalt, Religious
Convictions, supra note 18, at 1037-38. Cf. id. at 1031-32 (rejecting position that reli-
gious believer should attach no more weight to her personal experiences than would
outsider).
42. Nagel understands the force of this argument. See NAGEL, supra note 8, at
158-59. See also Nagel, supra note 35, at 235-36. Nonetheless, he argues for a middle
ground between the two interpretations of reasonable rejectability/public accessibility
that I have proffered. See NAGEL, supra note 8, at 159. My contention is that he fails to
make out a case for such a middle ground and ultimately must fall back either to a claim
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One gets the same results if one substitutes some sort of dialogic
test for the reasonable rejectability/public accessibility test, i.e., if
one allows coercive imposition of only those norms accepted through
dialogue among all the affected parties. Dialogic tests for the legiti-
macy of coercive imposition of norms come in two types: those re-
quiring actual dialogue among the affected parties, and those
that coercion will be self-defeating or to skepticism. Interestingly, Nagel treats religious
revelations as publicly inaccessible, but he fails to distinguish them from other types of,
similarly inaccessible sources of knowledge, e.g., personal observations and other personal
experiences.
Fallon, echoing Nagel, states that ultimate moral beliefs, but not religious beliefs, are
publicly accessible, though he admits he lacks any argument for this position. See Rich-
ard Fallon, Of Speakable Ethics and Constitutional Law: A Review Essay, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1523, 1549-52, 1557-58 (1989). See also DAVID A. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND
THE CONSTITUTION 76-78 (1986); Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1083, 1091-92 (1990).
For other attempts, similar to Nagel's, to locate a sense of reasonable rejectability that
is neither too strong nor too weak, see STEVEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES 47-49 (1990);
Samuel Freeman, Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation, and the Constitution,
21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 23-24, 31 (1992); Rawls, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS, supra note 9, at
243-49; Lawrence B. Solum, Pluralism and Modernity, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 96-99
(1990). Richard Arneson agrees that my position is correct if one is not a skeptic regard-
ing religious claims, but he ultimately endorses skepticism (subjectivism). See Richard
Arneson, Neutrality and Utility, 20 CAN. J. PHIL. 215, 234-36 (1990).
For general support of the position I am taking opposing Nagel's position, see GAL-
STON, supra note 26, at 108-09, 111-12; Scott C. Idleman, The Role of Religious Values
in Judicial Decision Making, 68 IND. L.J. 433, 445-48, 464-67, 482-84 (1993); Moore,
supra note 39, at 548-49; Raz, supra note 3, at 36, 39-40. See also Carter, Evolution-
ism, supra note 20, at 992-93; Greenawalt, Religious Convictions, supra note 18, at
1042-43.
Suppose someone in control of the coercive apparatus of government encounters aliens
from another planet who warn hint, based on research that is beyond human capacities,
that the Earth faces annihilation if nations do not disarm. (See The Day the Earth Stood
Still, 20th Century Fox, Farmington Hills, Mich., 1951.) Would it be "illiberal" in
Nagel's sense for him to rely on this knowledge, given that others are universally skepti-
cal when he tells them about the encounter? His claims are reasonably rejectable in the
strong sense I have identified, though not in the weak sense. Which sense should govern
his actions, and does some third sense exist that is intermediate between the two I've
identified? Is his encounter with space aliens any less accessible to others than his knowl-
edge of any nonreplicable historical event, such as that a spider crawled upon his bath-
room mirror at 2:15 p.m. Tuesday? If not, may he rely upon his knowledge of such
historical events, and what if they are "miraculous"?
Note that impure liberals like Greenawalt, while they would allow Ann to consult her
religious views on some issues, nonetheless require that she be able to distinguish those
views from purely secular ones. For Greenawalt, the latter are to govern decision making
on most issues and are to govern public argument on all issues. See GREENAWALT, supra
note 9, at 215-28. How is Ann, though, to distinguish her religious views from her secu-
lar ones? No sharp divide separating one set of her beliefs from another exists, and why
would it matter whether she is influenced by Aristotle or by Christ? And where does
Aquinas fit? It looks like "secular" can only be distinguished from "religious" using cri-
teria like Nagel's "publicly accessible reasons." However, I have argued these criteria do
not work because they are either too strong or too weak.
requiring a hypothetical, idealized dialogue. An actual dialogue test
is, in effect, a requirement of unanimity. Requiring unanimous ac-
ceptance of coercive norms, however, cannot be morally justified for
two reasons. First, the reasons for failure of unanimity can include
antisocial motives, ignorance of factual matters, illogic, deception,
misunderstanding, immaturity, fatigue, linguistic incompetence, and
a myriad of other factors that should discredit the objector. 43 (No
actual dialogue ever occurs in an "ideal speech situation. ' 44) Second,
and more fundamentally, an actual dialogue/unanimity requirement
requires some sort of default position, coercively imposed (as well as
an allocation of resources to maintain the actual dialogue, collected
from someone), to govern the parties unless and until they unani-
mously agree on a new set of coercively imposed norms.45 Yet, no set
of default norms has itself passed the test of unanimity in actual
dialogue. Requiring a dialogue about the default position, therefore,
leads to an infinite regress of default positions and dialogues.46
43. Actually, although all of these factors may prevent achievement of unanimity,
some of them will vitiate the results of unanimous agreement even if unanimity is
achieved.
The problem, pointed out by Walzer, is how to constrain actual dialogue to obviate
these problems without at the same time leaving the parties to the dialogue with nothing
left to discuss:
For the rules of engagement are designed to ensure that the speakers are free
and equal, to liberate them from domination, subordination, servility, fear, and
deference. Otherwise, it is said, we could not respect their arguments and deci-
sions. But once rules of this sort have been laid out, the speakers are left with
few substantive issues to argue and decide about. Social structure, political ar-
rangements, distributive standards are pretty much given; there is room only
for local adjustments.
Michael Walzer, Moral Minimalism, in FROM THE TWILIGHT OF PROBABILITY 3, 11
(William R. & Antonio Spadafora eds., 1992). See also Richard Rorty, The Advantages
of Moral Diversity, 9 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 38, 53 (1992) ("[T]he conditions that are
necessary to assure just and fair debate in the public sphere appear to presuppose the
happy outcome of just those debates.") Put differently, we have to know how the dia-
logue should come out substantively in order to know how to constrain it procedurally.
44. The principal proponent of a dialogic test for morality, a test which endorses
moral propositions that are acceptable to all dialogic participants in an "ideal speech
situation," is Habermas. JURGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF
SOCIETY (1979); JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1973). For a good account
of Habermas' "discourse ethics," see Douglas B. Rasmussen, Political Legitimacy and
Discourse Ethics, 32 INT'L PHIL. Q. 17 (1992).
That a moral proposition is accepted in a dialogue occurring in the "ideal speech situa-
tion" is usually conceived of, not as definitive of its moral truth, but as the best justifica-
tion of the belief that it is true. In other words, the dialogic test is epistemological, not
metaphysical. See also Carlos S. Nino, The Epistemological Moral Relevance of De-
mocracy, 4 RATIO JURIs 36, 42-43 (1991).
45. See Terrence Sandalow, A Skeptical Look at Contemporary Republicanism,
41 FLA. L. REV. 523, 542-43 (1989).
46. Another reason why dialogue might fail to produce correct moral beliefs, even
if it produces unanimity, is that the language of the participants privileges some moral
beliefs and forecloses others. This would appear to render impossible that any actual
dialogue could occur in an "ideal speech situation." See Margaret Jane Radin & Frank
Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L.
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For these reasons most dialogic tests for justifying coercive imposi-
tion of norms rely on a hypothesized and idealized dialogue among
parties who are rational, well-motivated, and dialogically constrained
in certain ways. Because such dialogues are hypothetical, they can
be replicated monologically without devoting resources to bringing
parties together, ensuring actual communication, and sustaining a
dialogue over time. Moreover, the results of the monological exercise
can be known virtually instantaneously, thus obviating the need to
have, and thus to justify, a coercively imposed default position. The
key to how to imagine the idealized hypothetical dialogue lies in
what types of knowledge, reasoning ability, emotional responses,
motivations, etc. one envisions the parties to the dialogue possessing.
If one allows for differences among the parties, then one faces the
possibility that they would not agree to any particular set of norms.
A dialogic test that allows for differences is functionally like the
strong reasonable rejectability/public accessibility test. One - and
Ann - can understand why those who have had different exper-
iences from Ann's would disagree with her norms were they to en-
gage in dialogue. One can also understand, though, why slave owners
would disagree with norms of racial equality.47
REV. 1019, 1041 (1991).
47. Moreover, not only do constraints that preserve differences make too many po-
litical outcomes reasonably rejectable, but the nature of the constraints themselves must
be "reasonable" in some non-question-begging way. For example, a constraint excluding
religious arguments from the actual dialogue would be question-begging in the context of
my disagreement with the pure liberals. See H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republican-
ism, 97 YALE L.J. 1703, 1709 (1988). Ackerman, for example, argues that neutral dia-
logue precludes asserting that one's conception of the Good is superior to others'.
ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 37. If, however, someone argues that her conception of the
Good is superior and gives evidence of its superiority, is she violating this constraint?
See Perry, supra note 9, at 10. If not, then the dialogic test doesn't exclude religious
arguments. If so, then the dialogic test rejects political positions that no one would want
rejected.
On the indeterminacy of dialogic tests generally, see George W. Dent, Jr., The 'Ten-
sions' of Liberalism, 38 PHIL. Q. 481, 484-85 (1988):
The liberal says: nothing I propose for a rule of social (political) life is to be
considered legitimate unless it receives the agreement of every last individual.
However, the disagreement of those individuals who refuse their agreement on
the basis of their allegiance to principles which are illiberal is not to be counted
as invalidating the legitimacy of my proposal. (The disagreement of those who
are insane, have defective or impaired rationality, is also not to be counted; but
I have put this aside.) How does this substantially differ from the same saying
in the mouth of a fascist, communist, National Front supporter, religious impe-
rialist, or whoever, with the appropriate substitutions (for example, 'The com-
munist says . . . principles which are anti-communistic . . .' etc.)? The only
difference that emerges on this account, between 'the liberal' and his social/
political opponents, is over the admissible attitudes and self-conception which
If one assumes complete interpersonal transparency among those
in the hypothesized dialogue, then Ann's experiences are everyone's.
This type of hypothesized dialogue is no different from the mono-
logue of the solitary thinker and the weak sense of reasonable
rejectability/public accessibility. If Ann conducts this imaginary di-
alogue, she will conclude that her norms would be unanimously ac-
cepted, for everyone would share her experiences and thus her (from
her view reasonable) beliefs.48
must be operative in grounding the agreement of anyone whose agreement it is
going to be proper to take into account as one of the conditions of identifying a
social proposal as legitimate, or in grounding the dissent of anyone whose dis-
sent is going to provide a proper reason for querying the legitimacy of it. The
liberal says it is all, but only, those who figure themselves and others basally,
and politically decisively, as nothing more than instances of the type 'seeker
after some good life or other' whose agreement to a social proposal is requisite
to its legitimacy, or whose dissent from it throws doubt on that. The agreement
of no one else who is to live under its requirements is necessary, since their
disagreement rests on improper and illegitimate (illiberal) grounds, and there-
fore, implies no proper basis for the withdrawal of the proposal. The commu-
nist speaks in just the same form; the matter of his utterance is, of course,
different.
Thus liberal social proposals, just as any social proposals of any kind save
those that involve nothing at all beyond violent brute-forced subjugation, claim
their legitimacy because they are held to be abstractly right on their own theo-
retically preferred basis, and are held to be agreed to by their own theoretically
generated appropriate audience, not because they win actual agreement. For
the objections of those that actually disagree will (often) be deemed immate-
rial and invalid, since grounded in principles which are inadmissible under the
conditions of the proposal. What must set liberalism apart from other political
theories cannot be its legitimation procedure: it shares the same form of that
procedure with all political theories. The real ground of difference is this. Lib-
eral social proposals are, by contrast with, say, fascist or religious imperialist
ones, more permissive and accommodating to variety (as Waldron stresses; this
is, of course, precisely why many people find them so exceptional. They are, in
short, liberal proposals. They take their grounding only in each person's desire
to make some good life or other for himself, not some more or less particular
good life. If they are in this way permissive, and if enough people are fairly
permissive in their stance towards the 'life-styles' of others, fairly widespread
actual agreement to them may be expected; they will find fairly widespread
acceptance. But the likelihood of widespread actual consent is simply a conse-
quence of these pre-existing attitudes and modes of mutual regard, and plays
no de jure role in establishing legitimacy. It is the liberal's openness to variety
which sets him apart; it is not his affording a larger, or different, role to agree-
ment and consent in the legitimation of political and social rules.
See also Robert J. Lipkin, Kibbitzers, Fuzzies, and Apes Without Tails: Pragmatism
and the Art of Conversation in Legal Theory, 66 TUL. L. REv. 69, 81-82, 84-85, 87
(1991).
48. See David Estlund, Book Review, 20 POL. THEORY 694, 696 (1992). If one is
to imagine a dialogue that is without limits on time, the participants in which are all
similarly motivated, and in which all information - including the personal experience
kind - is equally available, then one will envision a convergence of beliefs. Religious
beliefs will be no different in this respect from' other beliefs, including (self-referentially)
the belief that normative truth is what emerges from such an interpersonally transparent
dialogue regarding what ought to be done. See NAGEL, supra note 8; see also Richard
Arneson, Socialism as the Extension of Democracy, 10 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 145, 170-71
[VOL. 30: 763. 1993] Epistemological Unity
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Nagel wants to deny the epistemological continuity of religious be-
liefs and those beliefs that should govern public policy. He argues
that there are some beliefs, most notably religious beliefs, that are
reasonable for someone to accept who at the same time recognizes
that rejection of those beliefs by others is also reasonable.4 9 As I
pointed out above, however, in saying that it is reasonable for others
to reject what one believes, one is only saying that one can under-
stand how others, possessed of reason, have fallen into error. One
does not conclude from this that it is reasonable for the world to be
ruled by error.50
(1993) (arguing that dialogic tests are really just monologic counterfactual thought ex-
periments regarding what all rational, informed, etc., people would agree to).
The tendency among followers of Habermas is, indeed, to build all of the substantive
positions they themselves accept as correct into the preconditions for the idealized dia-
logue. See Walzer, supra note 43, at 11. The "dialogue" then will produce "agreement"
on precisely those substantive positions. How could it not do so? In the end, this merely
shows that however much we acknowledge that points of view exist different from our
own, points of view that are in some way reasonable for those whose points of view they
are, we are stuck inside our own point of view, which for us is the measure of truth of all
other points of view. Even the "postmodern" recognition that our point of view is just
that-a point of view-and that it has been socially constructed, has no practical conse-
quence for us. No available alternative to our point of view exists.
49. 'See supra note 39.
50. It may be useful at this point to rehash what I am attempting to demonstrate
by arguing for epistemological unity. My first point is that liberalism's truth entails the
falsity of some of Ann's beliefs. Pure liberalism entails that all of Ann's beliefs regarding
public policy of those that we have mentioned are false. Impure liberalism entails that
her beliefs regarding public support and endorsement of her religion are false, and per-
haps also her beliefs that pornography should be banned. My second point is that liber-
alism's claim to its truth and the falsity of Ann's opposing beliefs cannot rest on the
claim that liberalism's supporting epistemology is different from - and fairer than, more
respectful of autonomy than, more consistent with our free and equal nature than, etc. -
Ann's religious epistemology.
Liberalism asserts the moral primacy of individual autonomy, which can only be lim-
ited for the sake of others' autonomy. See Carlos S. Nino, Moral Discourse and Liberal
Rights, in ENLIGHTENMENT, RIGHTS AND REVOLUTION 155, 162-65 (Neil MacCormick
& Zenor Bankowski eds., 1989). It may, but it need not, rest on general religious skepti-
cism (it cannot rest on skepticism about all theories of the Good without being self-
undermining). Under liberalism, no one may be made an involuntary resource for others'
views of the Good - see NAGEL supra note 8, at 164-68; REIMAN, supra note 15, at
207-08 - and views of the Good that entail the permissibility of such coercion are, if
liberalism is correct, incorrect.
My point is that if liberalism is correct and illiberal religious views, therefore, are
incorrect, then liberalism is correct not by virtue of its operating in a separate epistemo-
logical domain, one in which it does not have to meet the evidence supporting illiberal
religious views head-on. No meta-epistemological vantage point exists from which it is
possible both for illiberal religious views to be correct and also for liberalism to be cor-
rect that imposing correct religious views is unfair in some trumping way (where a com-
ponent of such views is that imposing them is alright). (Rawls appears to believe in such
a meta-epistemological vantage point. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 9, at
Nagel clings to the hope that someone like Ann, with her beliefs,
can see that others are reasonable in rejecting her beliefs, and that,
in some trumping sense of "reasonable," not having her beliefs im-
posed on them is also reasonable, even though her beliefs about, say,
abortion (obviously reasonable from her point of view) include the
belief that they should be imposed.5' Nagel thinks erroneously that
243-45. A good response to both Rawls and Nagel is provided by Raz, supra note 3, at
238-40. See also Joseph Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, 11 OXFORD
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 303 (1991).)
In addition to offering the reasonable rejectability/public accessibility test and the dia-
logic test as grounds for excluding religious positions from determining public policy, the
liberal might offer the Rawlsian veil of ignorance as a conceptualization of fairness that
supports such an exclusion. Would persons behind the Rawlsian veil eschew reliance on
religious convictions? They would not want to have false views forced upon them, but
likewise they would not want to be prevented from acting on true views. Moreover, risk
aversion does not solve this dilemma, because without doing theology, one cannot mean-
ingfully compare the two risks. One cannot determine the position regarding religious
beliefs that would emerge from behind the Rawlsian veil without specifying what persons
behind the veil believe religiously. Furthermore, if one so specifies, each specification will
produce a different outcome. Persons behind the veil would exclude illiberal religious
beliefs only if their religious beliefs were liberal, i.e., only if their religious beliefs held
the beliefs' coercive imposition wrong in principle (or held to be wrong in practice be-
cause unlikely to succeed). See GALSTON, supra note 26, at 146-49.
The instinct among liberals to place religious claims on a different epistemological
level is so powerful that it affects even those who expressly repudiate such a move. Mar-
shall forcefully asserts that religion is on the same epistemological level as the political
theory of liberalism but then, in the same article, argues that admitting religion into the
public forum should be resisted. His reason is that religion, as the answer to humanity's
anxiety over death, evokes such powerful and often dark emotions that it must not be
given access to state power. Compare William Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 843, 845-47 (1993) with Id. at 858-59, 863. Interestingly, Marshall's posi-
tion assumes that religious answers to the mysteries of life and the terror of death are
either false or unknowable. For his proto-utilitarian argument against religious participa-
tion in the public square is advanced from no particular point of view, and surely not the
point of view of religions that deny that Marshall's dangers justify their exclusion from
the public square. Put differently, even if Marshall's gloomy forecasts are well-founded,
the consequentialism animating Marshall's arguments is of no higher status as an argu-
ment than religious arguments that deny the value he attaches to outcomes. He would
surely fail to convince one who was willing to shed blood to save souls.
For a liberal position similar to Marshall's, see GALSTON, supra note 26, at 177-82.
For an acceptance of Marshall's premise regarding the need to avoid violence, but a
rejection of his estimation of the threat posed by admitting religion to the public square,
see Gedicks, supra note 31, at 696 n.122.
51. At least since Kant, and pushed by Hegel and post-Hegelian idealists of vari-
ous stripes, including the modern Continental philosophers, the followers of Wittgenstein,
and the pragmatists, we have understood that the world presents itself to us filtered
through perceptual and conceptual categories. See CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 141-47,
225-31, 528-33 (1975); Allen Hance, Pragmatism as Naturalized Hegelianism: Over-
coining Transcendental Philosophy?, 46 REv. OF METAPHYSICS 343, 343 (1992); Rich-
ard Rorty, Foucault and Epistemology, in FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL READER 41, 44-45
(David Couzens Hoy ed., 1986). Moreover, these categories are relative not only to
humans as a species, but also to cultures and to individuals. All beliefs about the world
are perspectival, and each individual's perspective will be unique. Furthermore, an indi-
vidual can understand this without rejecting her beliefs or that they refer to the world
and not to themselves. Although their coherence to each other may support their truth,
their truth is a matter of correspondence with the world. See Philip Clayton, Two Kinds
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the "reasonable" alternative to coercive imposition of Ann's beliefs is
governmental neutrality or relegation of the matter to private
choice. 2 However, given what Ann's views are regarding abortion -
of Conceptual-Scheme Realism, 29 SO. J. PHIL 167 (1991) (that conceptual schemes
filter all thought and perception does not entail metaphysical nonrealism). See also CAR-
LOS S. NINO, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 103-07 (1991). Religious beliefs are no
different from any other beliefs in these respects.
The Hegelian, Wittgensteinian, Rortian, Fishian view that our categories are socially
constructed is an "is" from which no "ought" follows. See Stanley Fish, Almost Pragma-
tism: Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1447, 1464-69 (1990); Hol-
lenbach, supra note 13 at 92-93, 95; Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100
YALE L.J. 409 (1990). It surely does not entail our inability to transcend our cultural
categories, only that, like the rebuilding of Neurath's boat at sea, we cannot do it all at
once, and that when we do it we do it with the tools our culture provides us for its own
transcendence. The emphases on social construction, perspectivalism, and the ubiquity of
"interpretation" should be no more paralyzing in the normative domains than in the
scientific ones. See Thomas Kuhn, Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability,
2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE ASSOCIATION 669 (1982); Judith Lich-
tenberg, Objectivity and Its Enemies, 2 THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 56, 60-68 (1991/
92); Thomas Morawetz, Understanding Disagreement, The Root Issue of Jurisprudence:
Applying Wittgenstein to Positivism, Critical Theory, and Judging, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
371, 445-46 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV.
741, 773 n.113, 779-80 n.130 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991
DUKE L.J. 607, 617-19 n.47. See also MATHEW H. KRAMER, LEGAL THEORY, POLITICAL
THEORY. AND DECONSTRUCTION 239-43 (1990); Sotirios A. Barber, Stanley Fish and the
Future of Pragmatism in Legal Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1033 (1991); Ronald M.
Dworkin, Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND
SOCIETY 359-88, 360-64, 380-81 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991); Steven
Knapp, Practice, Purpose, and Interpretive Controversy, in id. at 323-42. Furthermore,
,this view surely does not entail that religious beliefs are any more suspect than other
beliefs. Indeed, if one holds a coherentist view of epistemological justification, then ap-
peals to religious beliefs are no different from appeals to other beliefs and reflect the
epistemological unity that coherentism assumes. See Stephan A. Gardbaum, Law, Polit-
ics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 685, 689, 705-19 (1992). See also
Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, DUKE L.J. 997, 1000 (1987).
Nor does the fact that our categories are socially constructed - indeed, that our
"selves" are, in part at least, socially constructed - entail abandonment of respect for
autonomy. See DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS By AGREEMENT 349-50 (1986); Charles E.
Larmore, Political Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 339, 349-52 (1990); Michael Walzer,
The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL THEORY 6, 21 (1990).
52. See also MACEDO, supra note 42, at 46-49; Rawls supra note 9, at 243-45;
Solum supra note 42, at 1100-01. Nagel's view is that some beliefs are objective in that
they appeal to more than the fact that they are believed and to a common ground of
justification. See NAGEL, supra note 8, at 159-62 (also supra note 39). Raz points out
that no one appeals to the fact of his own belief to justify the belief. Raz, supra note 3,
at 37-39. Either all beliefs satisfy Nagel's criterion of appealing to a common ground of
justification, or his criterion is far too strong and rules out direct perceptions and exper-
iences as legitimate bases for imposing beliefs. Much of science and all of morality would
be excluded as legitimate grounds for coercion. See Raz supra note 3, at 45-46; Perry,
supra note 9, at 12, 120. Actual consent is too strong a condition to demand for coercion,
and reasonable consent makes consent superfluous: No gap exists between what is a rea-
sonable principle and a principle to which it would be reasonable to consent. See Raz,
supra note 3, at 37-39.
or pornography, animal rights, and public funding of religious edu-
cation - obviously the "neutral" or private choice position is noth-
ing more than rejection of Ann's views. 53 Ann does not believe that
abortion, viewing pornography, eating meat, or failing to fund reli-
gious education is wrong just for her, but that these acts and omis-
sions are wrong for everyone. 54 No neutral position, intermediate
between Ann and those who reject her views, exists.,"
53. The same point can be made with respect to the education of children.
Whether conducted by the state or by parents with the coercive backing of the state,
education cannot be neutral regarding religion. Pure liberalism has real difficulty han-
dling the education of children without assuming that education does not affect the later
adult's ability to choose among theories of the Good.
54. "Privatization" of Ann's views - translating them from "it is wrong for any-
one to abort" to "it is wrong for me to do so" - is nothing other than rejecting them.
See Brian Barry, How Not to Defend Liberal Institutions, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD
44, 52-54 (R. Bruce Douglass et al. eds., 1990); Stephen L. Carter, The Inaugural De-
velopment Fund Lectures: Scientific Liberalism, Scientistic Law, 69 OR. L. REv. 471,
519-24 (1990); Amy Gutman & Dennis Thompson, Moral Conflict and Political Con-
sensus, 101 ETHIcs 67, 68, 75 (1990); Hollenbach, supra note 13, at 94-95, 104; David
M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern America: A
Response to Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1091-93 (1991); Wieseltier, supra
note 39, at 97-98 (quoted supra note 39).
55. See GALSTON, supra note 26, at 117, 273-76; Barry, supra note 54, at 55-56;
Greenawalt, Religious Convictions, supra note 18, at 1044-45; Neal, supra note 5, at
577-79. As Neal puts it:
Liberalism understands itself to be a political theory which permits no substan-
tive conception of what constitutes the good life for individuals to take public,
political priority over any other; it is hence neutral with regard to the question
of the good. I have argued that this liberal theory of neutrality regarding the
good presupposes a meta-theory of the good which is not neutral. That meta-
theory holds that conceptions of the good are properly understood as the indi-
vidually defined and possessed ends which separate selves pursue. Whether
they are shared and pursued collectively, or dissimilar and pursued antagonisti-
cally, is a contingent question of fact depending upon what substantive ends
happen to have been chosen. This meta-theory is non-neutral because it neces-
sarily rules out any alternative meta-theory which denies that a 'conception of
the good' can be properly understood as the ends which separate selves define
and pursue. One such alternative is that I ascribed to Ralph, who maintains
that 'conceptions of the good' are properly understood as essentially, and not
just contingently, shared relations which are primarily definitive of, and not
primarily defined by, individual selves. Ralph does not say conceptions of the
good are chosen; he says they are recognized.
Now it is possible for translations to be carried out in the other direction, as
say, when it is claimed that the liberal meta-theory of the good is in fact a
rationalization of an impoverished form of life, say that of consumerist capital-
ism. Nothing I have said thus far provides grounds for this, or any other, nor-
matively negative assessment of the liberal meta-theory of the good. Of course,
nothing said thus far necessarily lends support to liberal meta-theory either.
The choice, if choice is the proper word here, between alternative meta-theo-
ries of the good is in (at least) one key respect different from the individual
choice of a conception of the good within liberal meta-theory. The choice of a
conception of the good, of personal ends, within the language of liberal meta-
theory leaves every other individual at liberty to do the same, It is understood
as a private choice, one without public, political consequence for the choices of
others. But the decision to speak the language of that meta-theory is not with-
out public consequence; for if the good is a matter for private individual choice,
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Perhaps the strongest argument the liberal might use against Ann
without engaging Ann's views frontally, other than one based on
practical impossibility, would be an argument that denies that we
can ever be sufficiently certain about any religious beliefs, or beliefs
about the Good, to justify their coercive imposition. According to
this argument, we must allow diversity of such beliefs to flourish as
an experiment to test which beliefs ultimately gain universal assent,
the best gauge of their truth. 6 The view is analogous to the market-
place of ideas justification of freedom of speech and has analogous
theoretical difficulties.57 Universal assent as a test of truth of reli-
gious views is unproblematic, not because universal assent establishes
truth, but because universal assent leaves no dissenters to object to
its coercive imposition. Short of universal assent, we are faced with
the fact that the number of possible experiments yet untested is, and
always will be, infinite; yet coercive decisions are, in fact, always and
inevitably being made, always potentially in error, and always fore-
closing experiments that might have led to views commanding uni-
versal assent. Permitting abortion, if in error, costs millions of lives.
Moreover, permitting abortion prevents us from carrying on the ex-
periment of living in a society without abortion. More obviously, cer-
tain views of the Good requiring everyone to conform to certain
norms cannot be tested in the liberal marketplace of diverse individ-
ual lifestyles. On some religious views, the costs of their not being
coercively imposed are quite high (e.g., millions of innocent lives
lost, millions of souls unsaved), and no "neutral" ground is available.
I come to the conclusion, then, that liberalism and religion are on
the same epistemological level, and that the knowledge each claims,
if it be knowledge, has the same pedigree in experience and reason.
then it is not a matter for public political determination. There is no neutral
ground here, no 'meta-meta-' theory to which further appeal in the name of
neutrality can be made. If we are to speak of the good, then we have to speak;
only the skeptic has the false luxury of remaining silent. Alternative meta-
theories provide different languages for speaking of the good; but to speak any
one of them is not to speak the others, and this is as true of the language of
liberal meta-theory as it is of any other. The politics of neutrality is conducted
within a language which is, like its competitors, non-neutral; those who do not
speak it as a matter of course in liberal societies are provided, sometimes
against their wishes, with a translator. In the last analysis, that translator is
the state.
Id. at 578-79.
56. See D.A. LLOYD THOMAS, IN DEFENSE OF LIBERALISM 36-38 (1988); Kymlicka,
supra note 4, at 18-19.
57. See Larry Alexander and Paul Horton, The Impossibility of a Free Speech
Principle, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1319, 1349-50 (1983).
There are not two ways of "knowing," religious and secular/liberal;
there are not both sectarian and secular/liberal "truths." 8 As a con-
sequence of epistemological unity, liberalism must establish its tenets
by rejecting conflicting religious ones, not by the illusion of "neu-
trally" banishing them to the "private" realm, where they can some-
how remain "true" but impotent, but by meeting them head on and
showing them to be false or unjustified.59 Liberalism is, as many crit-
ics claim it to be, the "religion" of secularism. That does not mean
that liberalism is false or that antiliberal religious views are true.
What it does mean is that both liberalism and antiliberal religious
views inhabit the same realm and make conflicting claims within it.
Liberalism is not at a different level, where it can remain neutral
and impartial with respect to religious controversy that is truth-seek-
ing within a restricted domain, but not within the domain of
liberalism.60
That liberalism and religion are epistemological rivals has two ba-
sic implications. One, obvious and banal, is that the truth of those
core, defining tenets of liberalism entails the falsity of all conflicting
religious tenets.6' That much follows from the law of noncontradic-
tion. More importantly, and the burden of the bulk of my argument,
liberalism cannot establish its core tenets and its repudiation of illib-
eral religious ones (and banishment of religion from public debate)
by claiming to inhabit a different epistemological realm from that
occupied by religion, a realm whose truths not only trump those of
religion, but whose truths can be seen to be reasonable even by those
whose religious truths they trump.62 No epistemological perspective
58. See Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, supra note 20, at 940-42;
D'Agostino, supra note 40, at 159; Hollenbach, supra note 13, at 103-04.
59. See GALSTON, supra note 26, at 276-79; Raz, supra note 3, at 4.
60. See Fish, supra note 51, at 1000; Neal, supra note 5, at 577-79; Raz, supra
note 3, at 40, 43. See also Barry, supra note 54, at 53-54; Greenawalt, Religious Convic-
tions, supra note 18, at 1025.
61. Liberalism finds its most fertile soil among atheists, religious skeptics,
nonfundamentalist Protestants, reform Jews, and adherents of certain mystical religions.
See BRIAN BARRY, THEORIES OF JUSTICE 373-74 (1989); GALSTON, supra note 26, at
276-79; GERALD F. GAUS, VALUES AND JUSTIFICATION 356-59 (1990); IAN SHAPIRO, PO-
LITICAL CRITICISM 39 (1991); Barry, supra note 54, at 45-46, 53-54; Carter, supra note
54, at 477-99, 511-12; Greenawalt, Religious Convictions, supra note 18, at 1026; Fish,
supra note 51, at 999-1000; Hollenbach, supra note 13, at 105; Michael J. Perry, Neu-
tral Politics?, 51 REv. POL. 479, 488 (1989); Smolin, supra note 54, at 1072-76;
Stolzenberg, supra note 11, at 628-34. Liberal Catholics like Perry reject liberalism's
exclusion of religion from the public domain, but at the same time, because of their
liberal interpretation of religious truth, appear to believe that allowing religion to influ-
ence public policy will leave untouched most liberal concerns, especially those regarding
religious tolerance. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 9, at chs. 3, 9, 12, Conclusion, pp. 1-4;
but see id. at ch. 7, pp. 7-9 (arguments for tolerance). Cf. Smolin, supra note 54, at
1074-76, 1079-85 (arguing that Perry's approach excludes fundamentalists from the pub-
lic debate); Stanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 2061, 2074-75 (1992) (same). See also GALSTON, supra note 26, at 293-99.
62. Nagel labels religious views that reject his form of liberalism and its argument
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exists from which one can simultaneously hold Ann's views and, bar-
ring a belief that to do so would be self-defeating, hold that the state
should not impose them.63 Furthermore, to the extent that liberalism
defines itself by the proposition that religious views can be "true"
and important enough to protect, but cannot be fairly imposed
through public policy,64 a public policy that draws its "truths" from
a different epistemological well, to that extent the unity of epistemol-
ogy undermines liberalism. 5
against coercive imposition of reasonably rejectable positions "fanatical," implying their
falsity. NAGEL, supra note 8, at 168. However, because Nagel's test of reasonable rejec-
tion fails to achieve what he thinks it does, the Kantian ideal he champions against the
fanatics is too abstract and formal (and thus substantively empty) to counter illiberal
religious views while bypassing their direct refutation based on the evidence.
63. Several arguments for the proposition that imposition of religious views is self-
defeating have been advanced:
(1) Imposition will lead to rebellion. See Gardbaum, supra note 41, at 1357; Larmore,
supra note 15, at 346; Solum, supra note 42, at 99-100.
(2) Virtue is only attained if exercised freely (obviously a quite sectarian view itself, and
in any event one that neglects such alternative and illiberal paths to virtue as mandatory
religious education). See Waldron, supra note 14, at 81-83. See also WILL KYMLICKA,
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 203-04 (1990) (arguing that one's life cannot
be good unless lived in accordance with one's beliefs about what gives life value, an
obviously controversial position that presupposes knowledge, if not of the Good, at least
of what the Good is not).
(3) Autonomy has absolute value (another quite sectarian view, and one that hardly
anyone believes, given that it implies anarchy). See id. at 208-10. See also Smith, supra
note 11, at 191-222 (rejecting non-religious justifications for religious tolerance). Cf
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 200-01
(1992) (arguing that the liberalism of the Constitution is not a "religion" for constitu-
tional purposes even if it is on the same epistemological level).
64. Liberals frequently betray their general skepticism about religious claims even
as they purport to be religion's protectors. See e.g., Carter, The Religiously Devout
Judge, supra note 20, at 937-39 (arguing that religion marginalized by liberals' treat-
ment); Carter, Evolutionism, supra note 20, at 985-86, 994 (noting irony of excluding
religious arguments on grounds of their importance); Rawls, supra note 9, at 247 (imply-
ing agnosticism is only "reasonable" position to hold).
65. What the unity of epistemology undermines is liberalism as a political theory
resting on a distinction between the epistemology of political theory and the epistemology
of religious and other comprehensive world views. The unity of epistemology does not
undermine concerns for autonomy, social harmony, fairness, etc. Those concerns must,
however, be defended within the same epistemological domain as their contradictories.
Furthermore, they cannot be correct if their interpretation denies this unity of
epistemology.
On the unity of epistemology, see generally Gardbaum, supra note 41, at 1360, 1362;
Raz, supra note 3, at 23, 28.
IV. EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Although this Article is primarily an exercise in political/moral
theory, I should briefly mention its implications for First Amend-
ment Jurisprudence. The principal implication is that given episte-
mological unity, any line the courts draw between the religious and
the nonreligious, the sectarian and the secular - a line on which
First Amendment doctrine largely depends - will prove to be theo-
retically indefensible. Indeed, defining religion for purposes of apply-
ing the religion clauses has proved to be a major bugaboo for the
courts and commentators.6 Frequently, courts and commentators
"define" religion circularly by reference to terms, such as secular or
sectarian, that are defined, in turn, by reference to religion.67
One of the concerns that blocks finding an acceptable definition of
religion is that any definition will discriminate against some "reli-
gions" that do not satisfy its criteria.6 8 Because nondiscrimination
among religions is one of the principles that the First Amendment
expresses, officially defining religion for First Amendment purposes
itself paradoxically appears to violate the First Amendment. Of
course, the paradox is in one sense illusory. If the First Amendment
is intended to protect only religions that meet certain definitional cri-
teria, discriminating against "religions" that do not meet these crite-
ria cannot, by hypothesis, violate the First Amendment.
Nonetheless, although defining religion for purposes of the First
Amendment cannot violate the First Amendment in any literal
sense, at a deeper level the discrimination that drawing the defini-
tional line produces does seem to violate the First Amendment's ani-
mating spirit, especially if the First Amendment is viewed, as it
commonly is, through the prism of modern liberal theory, with its
emphasis on religious neutrality. Moreover, given the unity of reli-
gious and nonreligious epistemology, any definition of religion - any
attempt to draw a line between secular and sectarian - whether to
favor or to disfavor, to privilege or to exclude, a particular side of
this definitional divide - will be impossible to defend theoretically.6 9
Without such a definition, however, the First Amendment's religion
clauses cannot be applied.70
66. For a good survey of the literature and law on defining religion in the First
Amendment, see Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the
Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233 (1989). Ingber's own definition is found in Id. at
285-86.
67. Even philosophers are guilty of this. See, e.g., Paul J. Weithman, The Separa-
tion of Church and State: Some Questions for Professor Audi, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF, 52,
53 (1991).
68. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 318 n.4 (1952).
69. See also Perry, supra note 61, at 492.
70. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 63, at 200-01 (distinguishing religion from philosophy,
but without defining either).
[VOL. 30: 763. 1993] Epistemological Unity
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
My critique of liberal theory's treatment of religion explains not
only the First Amendment's definitional difficulty, but also its inter-
nal doctrinal contradictions. The commonplace view is that the Es-
tablishment and Free Exercise Clauses are in tension with one
another: to the extent the latter clause demands exemptions for or
encourages accommodations of "religious" activities (but not "secu-
lar" activities), it seems to run afoul of the former's command that
government not favor either particular religions or religions
generally.
In addition to this external conflict between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, conflict internal to each clause also exists.
The Establishment Clause is interpreted to demand neutrality
among religions and between religion and irreligion, but no neutral
principle for selecting the baseline that defines neutrality has been
established. 1
The Free Exercise Clause likewise lacks a neutral reading. In
some sense, the Free Exercise Clause is related to acknowledgement
of a higher law whose obligations are superior to those imposed by
Every definition of religion for First Amendment purposes potentially entails a claim
about religious truths. For example, if religion is defined deistically, this either implies
the truth of deistic claims or else expresses a concern with psychological torment that
deistic believers suffer (e.g., fear of damnation). However, if the latter is the concern,
how do we weigh the concern against government interests in a free exercise case? Sup-
pose, for example, someone claims that he will suffer eternal torture if he is not allowed
to inflict serious pain on his child? Rejecting his free exercise claim means both that we
believe his religious beliefs are false and that we are willing to let him be psychologically
tormented by his fear of eternal torture rather than let him inflict a (lesser) torment on
his child. Moreover, if we were to consider his psychological torment, but not his beliefs
that are its source, no reason exists not to consider equal psychological torment from
sources that our deistic definition ruled to be nonreligious. Ultimately, if the state out-
laws an act, and someone claims a religious duty to engage in that act, either the state or
the objector is in error about what are our duties. The objector may, of course, be psy-
chologically tormented by the state's ban even if he is mistaken about his religious objec-
tion to the ban. However, if that is the source of the free exercise right, no reason has
been established for preferring a relieving of psychological suffering based on false reli-
gious beliefs to a relieving of psychological suffering based on other false beliefs.
For the position that the Free Exercise Clause functions to protect nonmainstream
religions whose beliefs will not get a fair hearing in public debate (because minority
religious beliefs, unlike other minority beliefs, appear nonsensical to nonbelievers), see
Mark F. Kohler, Neutral Laws, Incidental Effects, and the Regulation of Religion and
Speech, 40 DRAKE L. REV. 225, 274-75 (1991). The author does not make out a case for
nonmainstream religious beliefs differing from nonmainstream beliefs of any sort in their
plausibility to adherents of mainstream beliefs.
71. Compare McConnell, supra note 11, at 188-94 with Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble
with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 776-79 (1992); and Ira C. Lupu,
Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommoda-
tion of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991).
the secular state. If such a higher law exists, then there is no need to
grant free exercise exemptions beyond those demanded by the higher
law; and everyone should get those exemptions, even those who do
not acknowledge the higher law. The latter are in error about the
demands of religion, and their views should not affect policy. Nor
should their religious liberty be respected, unless the true higher law
demands its respect.
If, on the other hand, free exercise requires that everyone's con-
ception of the higher law is to be treated as if it were correct, then
anarchy will prevail, and surely not the correct higher law, if one
exists.
Finally, if conceptions of the higher law prevail under the Free
Exercise Clause only if exemptions according to them do not impose
substantial costs, the higher law really is not being treated as higher
law. Secular law remains supreme over religious obligation.
The failure of First Amendment jurisprudence to achieve coher-
ence both within and between the religion clauses and to defend a
secular/sectarian distinction, on which distinction the clauses de-
pend, are directly related to the liberal theory's failure to reconcile
its high regard for religion and the freedom to seek religious truth
with its exclusion of religious-based claims from the domain of pub-
lic policy. 72 The dominant theme most likely to emerge from the
First Amendment will be one consistent with the treatment of reli-
gious differences by those Judeo-Christian sects and religious skep-
tics whose world views are most hospitable to philosophical
liberalism: imposition of religious truths will be forbidden because
(as some believe) the attempt will undermine a modus vivendi and
prove to be self-defeating, or because (as others believe) no religious
views can be known to be true; but religion will be relegated to a
private, marginalized domain.73
72. If one accepts the argument of epistemological unity, then not only will one
understand why no line exists between the religious and the secular (except one drawn by
stipulation), but one also will understand that the government does not have any action
that it can take or omit to take that will not in some eyes promote religion or in other
eyes promote irreligion, and that no law can be established that will not in some eyes
interfere with free exercise of religion without (in those eyes) serving a compelling inter-
est. See also STEVEN D. ShITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITU-
TIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (forthcoming 1994) (pointing out that no
neutral theory of religious freedom can exist because any theory will be premised on
beliefs that contradict those of some religions or nonreligion and, thus, will not be neutral
regarding those religions or nonreligion). For a recent attempt to base the constitutional
treatment of religion on its supposed distinct epistemology, see Abner Greene, The Polit-
ical Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1616-23 (1993). The argu-
ment of epistemological unity undermines Greene's claims.
73. See Gedicks, supra note 31, at 681. See also Stolzenberg, supra note 11, at
628-34 (pointing out how current religion clause doctrine tends to treat religious beliefs
as mere beliefs and not as truths and relegates religious beliefs to a marginalized, private
realm, possibly in opposition to what those beliefs affirm should be the case).
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
If liberalism is correct, then it is so for all the reasons there are,
including religious ones.
7 4
If liberalism is correct, then illiberal religions, or at least their il-
liberal components, are incorrect. The plausibility of any tenet of
liberalism that holds religion should be excluded from influencing
coercive policy decisions must rest ultimately on the claim that reli-
gious beliefs to the contrary are false, unknowable, or incapable of
providing good reasons for acting.
No epistemological divide distinguishing religious and secular be-,
liefs exists such that religious beliefs about public policy can be
"true" in one sense, but irrelevant in another. Nor is it somehow
fairer to rely on secular reasons because of their allegedly greater
accessibility.
If we accept the existence of religious truths that bear on coercive
public policy, and if as liberals we want people to be free to pursue
them, we cannot argue for excluding religious claims except on the
ground that in the specific-case they are wrong (and the religious
views underlying them are wrong).
Perhaps the most defensible version of liberalism is Raz's.7 5 The
liberal knows that there are plural forms of life that are Good in
modern society, as well as forms of life that are not Good. To know
and to choose among the possible Goods and against the Bad, indi-
viduals must be capable of achieving autonomy, and the state must
foster autonomy. Religious views may or may not be true, and if
they are not, they are not among those forms of life that are Good.
Moreover,. if they contradict the above tenets of liberalism, they are
by hypothesis untrue, though their extirpation through state coercion
may be counterproductive or unwise for other reasons. Raz's liber-
alism is in no sense neutral regarding religious claims; it endorses
only true religion, which by hypothesis is one recognizing multiple
Goods.76
74. Robert Audi argues that God would provide us with power to discern the Right
and the Good apart from reliance on scripture. See Robert Audi, The Place of Religious
Argument in a Free and Democratic Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677. This is a
paradigmatically religious argument for liberalism; and though it may be persuasive, it is
surely religiously partisan (non-neutral). Illiberal religions would surely reject it.
75. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
76. For a discussion of Raz's and others' liberal perfectionism, see STEPHEN
MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS 260-62 (1993); NINO,
supra note 51, at 132-37. For other perfectionist accounts of liberalism, see Steven
Macedo, Charting Liberal Virtues, in VIRTUE 204, 208-10, 215-22, 223-28 (John W.
A purer form of liberalism - one stripped of the perfectionist ves-
tiges of Raz's liberalism - might be premised on a belief that truths
about the Good, religion, etc., exist, that they may become knowable
in time, but that the only thing we can be reasonably confident about
is that we do not know - have justifiable beliefs regarding - these
truths now. Liberalism couples this moderately skeptical premise
with premises about human dignity and about the benefits of diverse
living experiments in the search for truths about how to live to derive
its familiar congery of rights and liberties. Of course, if someone
claims to have discovered the truth about the Good, and the truth is
of a type that licenses or compels coercion of dissenters, the liberal
cannot dismiss the claim out of hand; the liberal must confront the
claim and its evidence head on and only thereafter rule it unpersua-
sive. On this version of liberalism, we do not already know that the
Good, whatever it is, is consistent with liberalism's core policies; we
only believe so provisionally, as a working hypothesis.
I am a liberal (and a religious agnostic). I reject illiberal views of
all sorts, and religious views, liberal or illiberal. I would support a
rule outlawing reliance on any illiberal argument in setting public
policy. Indeed, I would support a rule outlawing reliance on any
premises I reject. The basis of such a rule is not religious versus
secular, controversial versus noncontroversial, or inaccessible versus
accessible. The basis is "consistent with Alexander's beliefs" versus
"inconsistent with Alexander's beliefs." My second best rule would
be the closest rule to my first-best rule that I could gain acceptance
of by others. My rule would be as accessible or inaccessible to others
with religious, illiberal views as their views are to me. This is why, at
the apex of one's philosophical system, one's own point of view is
what matters, not in the postmodern sense that point of view is eve-
rything, ontologically, but in the epistemic sense that there is no
other vantage point from which one can adjudicate.
Here is the complication for me. As a liberal, I hold one value to
be central - autonomy. For that reason, I must support others' free-
dom of thought, etc., not just insofar as this support is instrumental
for me, but as an end for them. It follows, therefore, that I must
support their freedom to reach what are (from my - who else's? -
point of view) erroneous conclusions; this means they must be free to
reach illiberal conclusions, which by hypothesis are erroneous. And
that is the danger. They - the illiberals - may become numerous
enough to overturn my preferred, liberal rules. Moreover, I believe in
Chapman & William GaIston eds., 1992); David A. Strauss, The Liberal Virtues, in id.
at 197-203. See also Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality, in THE TANNER
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES XI 3, 110-17 (Grethe R. Peterson ed., 1990) (developing
perfectionist account of liberal tolerance).
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the value of the autonomy that permits them to reach the (errone-
ous) conclusion that neither my nor their autonomy has such value.
That is the paradox of liberalism - send in the tanks to prevent the
antiliberal Islamic party from gaining its democratic victory in Alge-
ria;77 respect liberal democracy's rules and watch them lead to their
own destruction. That paradox is why Robert Frost said of the lib-
eral that he cannot take his own side in an argument. a
So I reject illiberal views, including religious ones. They are
wrong. If I am right, though, people should be free in a way that
makes their coming to hold illiberal views a live possibility. If they
do come to hold illiberal views, however, there is no argument I can
make - except the arguments for autonomy and against the illiberal
views and their foundations, religious or nonreligious - that sup-
ports excluding their views from influencing policy. Indeed, given
their illiberal premises, my liberal views will be just as inaccessible
to them as theirs are to me. If they do not buy my arguments for
liberalism and reject their own illiberal views, they will see no reason
not to treat me illiberally. Nor will they regard imposing their (true
from their perspective) views on me as unfair. No meta-position has
been established that the liberal occupies above liberal versus illib-
eral disputes.
Ultimately, then, the only reason to exclude religious views from
the realm of coercive public policy - for the liberal or anyone else
- is because those views are wrong. And the liberal's particular
problem is that he believes it wrong to extirpate erroneous views
coercively.
In the end, the source of the liberal's regard for autonomy is that
each of us has a particular point of view from which we cannot es-
cape. The source of the liberal's dilemma is that some points of view
will be closer to the truth than others, including the truth about the
value of autonomy itself.
77. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, Rulers Taking Power in Algeria Halt Elections to
the Parliament, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1992, at Al.
78. "A liberal is a man too broadminded to take his own side in a quarrel." WIL-
LIAM MORROW AND COMPANY, MORROW'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF CONTEM-
PORARY QUOTATIONS 298 (1982) (compiled by Jonathan Green) (the saying is
commonly attributed to Robert Frost).

